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BOOK REVIEW
TRIAL HANDBOOK FOR MAINE LAWYERS. By Bob Stolt
(Lawyers Cooperative Publishing; $97.50)
Reviewed by Joel C. Martin*
Lawyers Cooperative Publishing has issued trial handbooks for
practitioners in some twenty-three states. One now appears for
Maine lawyers, under the supervision of Bob Stolt' of the Maine
Bar.
Trial Handbook for Maine Lawyers is a single-volume compen-
dium of Maine precedent and practice as they relate to trials. Ex-
cluding the discovery matters that precede the trial and the appeal
that may follow it, the book focuses on the actual conduct of the
trial, from jury selection to verdict and judgment. In between, it
covers the necessary matters: opening statements, the order and
burden of proof, examination of witnesses, evidence, damages, and
closing arguments. As with the corresponding trial handbooks in
other states, this volume aims to collect in one place much of what a
lawyer needs to know before going to trial and while in the midst of
it.
We have not had such a book in Maine before now, and for that
reason alone its appearance is welcome. But there are other reasons
as well: the format is clear and logical; cross-references to other use-
ful sources of information are provided throughout; and the presen-
tation is generally well-balanced. The section on objections to evi-
dence is an example of what is best in the book: it refers the reader
to Am. Jur. digests and forms, to ALR annotations, and to the rele-
vant Maine Rules of Evidence; it cites the leading Maine cases; and,
by cross-reference, it directs the reader to related chapters of the
book, such as those on mistrial and examination of witnesses.
The material in the book necessarily overlaps with that of several
other books on the Maine litigator's shelf. The most extensive over-
lap is with Richard Field and Peter Murray's book on evidence.2
Stolt devotes nearly a third of his book (as he must) to evidence
issues, but one will still want the benefit of the fuller discussions by
Messrs. Field and Murray. There is of course some overlap with
Field, McKusick & Wroth, Maine Civil Practice,' but Stolt does not
attempt to duplicate what those volumes have so comprehensively,
* Partner, Petruccelli & Martin, Portland, Me. B.A.. Harvard University. 1965;
J.D., University of Chicago, 1977.
1. Partner, Lipman & Katz, Augusta, Me.
2. RICHARD H. FIELD & PETER L MURRAY, MAINE EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1987).
3. RICHARD H. FIELD. VINCENT L McKuSiCK & L KINVIN WROTH. MAINE CIVIL
PRACTICE, (2d ed. 1970 & Supp. 1981).
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if not recently, treated. Throughout the volume there are useful ci-
tations to Cluchey & Seitzinger, Maine Criminal Practice," and to
Justice Alexander's Maine Jury Instruction Manual5
The author's greatest debt, however, is to another Lawyers Coop-
erative publication, the multi-volume Am. Jur. 2d. Indeed, the debt
is perhaps too great, and it illustrates the problem facing the author
of any broad treatise on Maine law. A small state with only one
court of record produces relatively few opinions. One who would
summarize Maine practice and precedent is therefore in a dilemma:
whether to rely on Maine cases alone, which provide slim support in
many areas, or to refer broadly to the general law as contained in
compendia such as Am. Jur. 2d.
Stolt has chosen the latter course, and it may indeed be a neces-
sary choice. But his dependence on Am. Jur. is very great, even on
occasion to the point of replication. Much of his discussion of shift-
ing the burden of proof,6 for example, is taken almost verbatim from
the corresponding entry in Am. Jur. 2d.7 Similarly, Stolt has relied
heavily on versions of the trial handbook published in other states.
Here are the opening paragraphs of Stolt's book and those of the
Massachusetts counterpart: 8
Maine
The role of the attorney in the trial
of the case is extremely complicated
and becomes even more so when the
case involves controversial or com-
plex issues. On the one hand, the
attorney is charged with a duty to
represent his or her client with vigor
and determination. Failure to do so
not only results in loss of income,
prestige and subjection to disci-
plinary action, but also may result
in civil liability for malpractice.
On the other hand, if the attorney
is overly enthusiastic, he or she runs
the danger of causing a mistrial,
committing reversible error, being
guilty of contempt of court and even
being subject to disciplinary action.
The attorney who enters the
Massachusetts
The role of the attorney in the trial
of the case is extremely demanding,
particularly when the case involves
controversial or complex issues. On
the one hand, the attorney is
charged with a duty to represent
his or her client with vigor and
determination. Failure to do so not
only results in loss of income and
prestige, but also may result in civil
liability for malpractice. On the
other hand, if the attorney is overly
enthusiastic, he or she runs the
danger of causing a mistrial,
committing reversible error, being
guilty of contempt of court and
even being subjected to disciplinary
action.
The lawyer who enters the
4. DAVID P. CLUCHEY & MICHAEL D. SEITZINGER, MAINE CRIMINAL PRACTICE (rev.
ed. 1992).
5. DONALD A. ALEXANDER, MAINE JURY INSTRUCTION MANUAL (2d ed. 1990).
6. BOB STOLT, TRIAL HANDBOOK FOR MAINE LAWYERS § 9.6 (1991) [hereinafter
STOLT].
7. 29 Am JUR. 2D Evidence § 124 (1967).
8. EDWARD M. SWARTZ, TRIAL HANDBOOK FOR MASSACHUSETTS LAWYERS (2d ed.
1990).
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courtroom is obligated to do so with courtroom is obligated to do so with
a thorough knowledge of the rules a thorough knowledge of the rules
of evidence and procedure which of evidence and procedure that will
will guide his or her conduct while guide his or her conduct while he or
in the courtroom. These rules are she is there. These rules are
constantly changing, as a result of constantly changing, as a result of
the activities of appellate courts, the activities of appellate courts,
state and federal legislation, and state and Federal legislation, and
changes in practice and procedure changes in practice and procedure
adopted by the local trial courts.9  adopted by the local trial courts.'0
This may not be improper in any strict sense, because the same
publisher holds the copyright on both books. It does illustrate, how-
ever, what this volume is and what it is not; at heart it is an all-
purpose book adapted to local conditions, rather than one that
grows organically from this jurisdiction.
This broad generality in scope limits the book in some other ways.
For example, while the chapter on search and seizure issues is exten-
sive and well-organized, it leans heavily on federal sources. Certainly
the United States Supreme Court is the primary authority for
Fourth Amendment law. But it is a surprise to find only ten cases
from the Maine Law Court, three from the First Circuit, and none
at all from Maine's Federal District Court in fifty pages of text cit-
ing well over two hundred cases from 1920 onward. The paucity of
Maine sources will, I suspect, limit the usefulness of this section to
the Maine practitioner.
At times, too, the generality of the discussion and its limited reli-
ance on experience hamper the presentation of a topic. The chapter
on jury selection provides an illustration. It is correct to say, as the
author does, that under Maine law" "[a]t the Court's discretion,
counsel of record are entitled to inspect the list of jurors for use in
voir dire."' The implication in this bare statement, however, is that
lawyers must go through a procedure-perhaps even application to
the court-before looking at this material. Experienced practitioners
know that jury questionnaires are in fact customarily and immedi-
ately available in the clerk's office, and that reviewing them is an
essential part of preparing for trial.
They know, too, that challenges for cause are exercised before the
jury panel is drawn, and peremptory challenges afterward. In this
book, however, defining the civil jury panel as fourteen persons, the
author says, "From this panel the final jury is selected by challenges
for cause and peremptory challenges."' 3 A later section identifies the
9. STOLT, supra note 6, § 1.1.
10. SWARTZ, supra note 7, § 1.1.
11. ME. REV. STAT ANN. tit. 14, § 1254-A(7) (West Supp. 1991-1992).
12. STOLT, supra note 6, § 6.2.
13. Id. § 6.5.
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correct procedure. But the nature of such a handbook is that its
users are likely to dip in and out of it without reading the entire
chapter. When a section does not stand correctly on its own, the risk
of misdirection is great. Thus when, in a section dealing with jury
instructions, Stolt observes that "[iJnstructions are read to the jury
prior to closing argument,"" a correction later in the chapter does
not help the attorney who relied on what she first found.
At times the text misleads because its treatment of an issue is not
full enough. For example, in section 18.8, discussing privileged com-
munications between attorney and client, Stolt writes that Evidence
Rule 502(d)(1) and Rule 3.6(l)(4) of the Maine Bar Rules "permit an
attorney to reveal a fraud upon a third party in the course of the
representation.' 5 It is true that the evidence rule removes the privi-
lege "[i]f the services of the lawyer were sought or obtained to en-
able or aid anyone to commit. . . a crime or fraud."16 And Bar Rule
3.6(1)(4) does permit a lawyer, despite the privilege, to disclose a cli-
ent's intention to commit a crime. But Bar Rule 3.6(c) (not cited in
the text) puts strict limits on when the disclosure of a fraud may
occur. Indeed, the Professional Ethics Committee of the Board of
Overseers of the Bar has noted that "Bar Rule 3.6(c) specifically
prohibits disclosure of fraudulent conduct by a client, even if the
fraud occurs during the representation, if the attorney learns of the
fraud through a privileged communication."' 7 Stolt's blanket state-
ment that "[t]he privilege does not apply where the client consults
the attorney in furtherance of a crime of fraud"" misses most of the
subtleties of the analysis.
Some of the statements in the handbook are simply incorrect. In
discussing circumstantial evidence, for example, the author states,
"The absence of previous accidents is not admissible."'' This has
not been true since Payson v. Bombardier Ltd.,"0 which allows such
evidence to be introduced once an adequate foundation has been
laid.
Finally, and regrettably, the author's copy editor has served him
poorly. There are many sentences that do not parse, misplaced
punctuation marks, sentence fragments, and misspellings. 2 Some-
times this leads to nothing more than momentary confusion; some-
times it makes nonsense of the text. One sentence in the section on
14. Id. § 37.7.
15. Id. § 18.8.
16. ME R EVID 502(d)(1).
17. Professional Ethics Committee of the Board of Overseers of the Bar, Op. No.
60, 0-219-20. (Sept. 4, 1985).
18. STOLT, supra note 6, § 18.8.
19. Id. § 32.5.
20. 435 A.2d 411, 413 (Me. 1981).
21. Perhaps the most startling of these is the citation of "Field, McCusik &
Roth." STOLT, supra note 6, § 40.1, at 539 n.1.
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handwriting as evidence, for example, says: "Almost always expert
testimony will be required before the jury makes its own [handwrit-
ing] comparison."22 The next sentence disagrees: "No expert testi-
mony is required before the jury makes its own comparison."2 None
of these instances of carelessness is fatal in itself, but together they
raise concerns about the overall accuracy of the work.
That is a shame, because there is much in the book that is of use
to the litigator; and certainly there is no other one-volume treat-
ment of so many topics related to trials in Maine. Perhaps a later
edition will correct the problems in this one. When that happens,
this handbook will be ready to take a place on the short shelf of
indispensable books for Maine lawyers.
22. Id. § 26.16.
23. Id.
1992]

